commit 347645ee84f67cfb231f516c3e952b052d1bc9eb from: djm date: Mon Jul 01 07:57:12 2024 UTC openssh-9.8 commit - f92abb41906b9b6bab253afd040dc56835720c2e commit + 347645ee84f67cfb231f516c3e952b052d1bc9eb blob - bc54feb4952b223f3650f286a0b28661bd5d76ab blob + 20f4a267535ed1b359c15bcb051f73937f1ca2f3 --- build/Makefile +++ build/Makefile @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ OPENNTPD_PORTABLE_VERSION= 6.8p1 # also update mirrors/rpki-client-portable.html.head RPKI_CLIENT_PORTABLE_VERSION= 9.1 -OPENSSH_VERSION= 9.7 -OPENSSH_PORTABLE_VERSION= 9.7p1 +OPENSSH_VERSION= 9.8 +OPENSSH_PORTABLE_VERSION= 9.8p1 all: ../groups.html ../support.html ../ftp.html blob - a6311db8192baa5b7a9e0c2972efff0a493fa943 blob + 86d0e8238f68ed8c20f1e388d1d8530d00ccb382 --- build/mirrors/openssh-ftp.html.head +++ build/mirrors/openssh-ftp.html.head @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Mirrors

-OpenSSH 9.7 base source code: released March 11, 2024 +OpenSSH 9.8 base source code: released July 1, 2024

The base source code is designed specifically for blob - 2310c9b1384d1b4a5042a30e244aa35af4e8fad9 blob + fc591d9a802da784c1e81017f6ef0bb7f76c634f --- build/openssh/releases.pl +++ build/openssh/releases.pl @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ my %date_override = ( '3.8.1p1' => '2004-04-19', '3.9' => '2004-08-18', '4.0' => '2005-03-09', + '9.8' => '2024-07-01', ); my %releases; blob - fb13bba9229c2ef062c920f4e5735d90f5b5bd78 blob + 80e44d75c3bcd70ba2bada9c53746911cc5393de --- openssh/ftp.html +++ openssh/ftp.html @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Mirrors

-OpenSSH 9.7 base source code: released March 11, 2024 +OpenSSH 9.8 base source code: released July 1, 2024

-OpenSSH 9.7 released March 11, 2024 +OpenSSH 9.8 released July 1, 2024

OpenSSH is the premier connectivity tool for remote login with the SSH protocol. blob - 9a08e6ffb3a5b618a2f946878e2a9379b3b20d2a blob + d30223f7338a57597d88da225b85229240de4d38 --- openssh/openbsd.html +++ openssh/openbsd.html @@ -37,6 +37,25 @@ OpenBSD machines:

OpenSSH 9.8: July 1, 2024

+ +

+ +https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/openssh-9.8.tar.gz + +

+# cd /usr/src/usr.bin
+# tar zxvf .../openssh-9.8.tar.gz
+# cd ssh
+# make obj
+# make cleandir
+# make depend
+# make
+# make install
+# cp ssh_config sshd_config /etc/ssh # (optional)
+

+and restart sshd. +

OpenSSH 9.7: March 11, 2024

blob - 2b719ddce8313246cf88851fedea1de634825c2e blob + 86d41f8f4bf414aff366afc230245a07623ff9ad --- openssh/releasenotes.html +++ openssh/releasenotes.html @@ -22,6 +22,273 @@ Release Notes
+
OpenSSH 9.8/9.8p1 (2024-07-01)
+
```
+OpenSSH 9.8 was released on 2024-07-01. It is available from the
+mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.
+OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
+includes sftp client and server support.
+
+Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
+continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
+code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
+project. More information on donations may be found at:
+https://www.openssh.com/donations.html
+
+Security
+========
+
+This release contains fixes for two security problems, one critical
+and one minor.
+
+1) Race condition in sshd(8)
+
+A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH
+versions 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code
+execution with root privileges.
+
+Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc
+systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on
+average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the
+server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be
+possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that
+these attacks will be improved upon.
+
+Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been
+examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux
+distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection
+ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't
+understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation.
+OpenBSD is not vulnerable.
+
+We thank the Qualys Security Advisory Team for discovering, reporting
+and demonstrating exploitability of this problem, and for providing
+detailed feedback on additional mitigation measures.
+
+2) Logic error in ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming
+
+In OpenSSH version 9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive), when connected to an
+OpenSSH server version 9.5 or later, a logic error in the ssh(1)
+ObscureKeystrokeTiming feature (on by default) rendered this feature
+ineffective - a passive observer could still detect which network
+packets contained real keystrokes when the countermeasure was active
+because both fake and real keystroke packets were being sent
+unconditionally.
+
+This bug was found by Philippos Giavridis and also independently by
+Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford of the
+University of Cambridge Computer Lab.
+
+Worse, the unconditional sending of both fake and real keystroke
+packets broke another long-standing timing attack mitigation. Since
+OpenSSH 2.9.9 sshd(8) has sent fake keystoke echo packets for
+traffic received on TTYs in echo-off mode, such as when entering a
+password into su(8) or sudo(8). This bug rendered these fake
+keystroke echoes ineffective and could allow a passive observer of
+a SSH session to once again detect when echo was off and obtain
+fairly limited timing information about keystrokes in this situation
+(20ms granularity by default).
+
+This additional implication of the bug was identified by Jacky Wei
+En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford and we thank them
+for their detailed analysis.
+
+This bug does not affect connections when ObscureKeystrokeTiming
+was disabled or sessions where no TTY was requested.
+
+Future deprecation notice
+=========================
+
+OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in
+early 2025. This release disables DSA by default at compile time.
+
+DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being
+limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its
+estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric equivalent.
+
+OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained
+run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only mandatory-to-
+implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly because alternative
+algorithms were encumbered by patents when the SSHv2 protocol was
+specified.
+
+This has not been the case for decades at this point and better
+algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH
+implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining DSA
+in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from OpenSSH
+can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography
+libraries.
+
+This release, and its deactivation of DSA by default at compile-time,
+marks the second step in our timeline to finally deprecate DSA. The
+final step of removing DSA support entirely is planned for the first
+OpenSSH release of 2025.
+
+DSA support may be re-enabled in OpenBSD by setting "DSAKEY=yes"
+in Makefile.inc. To enable DSA support in portable OpenSSH, pass
+the "--enable-dsa-keys" option to configure.
+
+Potentially-incompatible changes
+--------------------------------
+
+ * all: as mentioned above, the DSA signature algorithm is now
+   disabled at compile time.
+
+ * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that
+   repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever
+   completing authentication or that crash the server. See the
+   discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information.
+   Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or
+   servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or
+   proxies may need to consider these settings.
+
+ * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8),
+   and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much
+   smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH
+   protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege
+   separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and
+   disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further
+   separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is
+   planned for the future.
+
+ * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some
+   log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process
+   named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd".
+
+ * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines
+   containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error.
+   This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new
+   "-q" flag to silence them altogether.
+
+ * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0]
+   as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5)
+   directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This
+   defaults to "sshd". bz2101
+
+ * (portable OpenSSH only) Automatically-generated files, such as
+   configure, config.h.in, etc will now be checked in to the portable
+   OpenSSH git release branch (e.g. V_9_8). This should ensure that
+   the contents of the signed release branch exactly match the
+   contents of the signed release tarball.
+
+Changes since OpenSSH 9.7
+=========================
+
+This release contains mostly bugfixes.
+
+New features
+------------
+
+ * sshd(8): as described above, sshd(8) will now penalise client
+   addresses that, for various reasons, do not successfully complete
+   authentication. This feature is controlled by a new sshd_config(5)
+   PerSourcePenalties option and is on by default.
+
+   sshd(8) will now identify situations where the session did not
+   authenticate as expected. These conditions include when the client
+   repeatedly attempted authentication unsucessfully (possibly
+   indicating an attack against one or more accounts, e.g. password
+   guessing), or when client behaviour caused sshd to crash (possibly
+   indicating attempts to exploit bugs in sshd).
+
+   When such a condition is observed, sshd will record a penalty of
+   some duration (e.g. 30 seconds) against the client's address. If
+   this time is above a minimum configurable threshold, then all
+   connections from the client address will be refused (along with any
+   others in the same PerSourceNetBlockSize CIDR range) until the
+   penalty expire.
+
+   Repeated offenses by the same client address will accrue greater
+   penalties, up to a configurable maximum. Address ranges may be
+   fully exempted from penalties, e.g. to guarantee access from a set
+   of trusted management addresses, using the new sshd_config(5)
+   PerSourcePenaltyExemptList option.
+
+   We hope these options will make it significantly more difficult for
+   attackers to find accounts with weak/guessable passwords or exploit
+   bugs in sshd(8) itself. This option is enabled by default.
+
+ * ssh(8): allow the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the
+   implicit fallback from certificate host key to plain host keys.
+
+Bugfixes
+--------
+
+ * misc: fix a number of inaccuracies in the PROTOCOL.*
+   documentation files. GHPR430 GHPR487
+
+ * all: switch to strtonum(3) for more robust integer parsing in most
+   places.
+
+ * ssh(1), sshd(8): correctly restore sigprocmask around ppoll()
+
+ * ssh-keysign(8): stricter validation of messaging socket fd GHPR492
+
+ * sftp(1): flush stdout after writing "sftp>" prompt when not using
+   editline. GHPR480
+
+ * sftp-server(8): fix home-directory extension implementation, it
+   previously always returned the current user's home directory
+   contrary to the spec. GHPR477
+
+ * ssh-keyscan(1): do not close stdin to prevent error messages when
+   stdin is read multiple times. E.g.
+   echo localhost | ssh-keyscan -f - -f -
+
+ * regression tests: fix rekey test that was testing the same KEX
+   algorithm repeatedly instead of testing all of them. bz3692
+
+ * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): clarify the KEXAlgorithms directive
+   documentation, especially around what is supported vs available.
+   bz3701.
+
+Portability
+-----------
+
+ * sshd(8): expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 always to PAM auth modules
+   unconditionally. The previous behaviour was to expose it only when
+   particular authentication methods were in use.
+
+ * build: fix OpenSSL ED25519 support detection. An incorrect function
+   signature in configure.ac previously prevented enabling the recently
+   added support for ED25519 private keys in PEM PKCS8 format.
+
+ * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): allow the presence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY
+   environment variable to enable SSH_ASKPASS, similarly to the X11
+   DISPLAY environment variable. GHPR479
+
+ * build: improve detection of the -fzero-call-used-regs compiler
+   flag. bz3673.
+
+ * build: relax OpenSSL version check to accept all OpenSSL 3.x
+   versions.
+
+ * sshd(8): add support for notifying systemd on server listen and
+   reload, using a standalone implementation that doesn't depend on
+   libsystemd. bz2641
+
+Checksums:
+==========
+
+ - SHA1 (openssh-9.8.tar.gz) = bc45cedae7f70b41e9922ef4c9f56e74b9a659b7
+ - SHA256 (openssh-9.8.tar.gz) = Dnc69VLWFBFdiaz8wySPlvHjb7wZfh/kblQ8ISuQr1Y=
+
+ - SHA1 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz) = a0bb501b11349f5c5c33a269351be091dc2c2727
+ - SHA256 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz) = 3YvQAqN5tdSZ37BQ3R+pr4Ap6ARh9LtsUjxJlz9aOfM=
+
+Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not
+hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP
+key used to sign the releases is available from the mirror sites:
+https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc
+
+Reporting Bugs:
+===============
+
+- Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html
+  Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh@openssh.com
+
+
+
```
OpenSSH 9.7/9.7p1 (2024-03-11)
```
 OpenSSH 9.7 was released on 2024-03-11. It is available from the
@@ -12295,4 +12562,4 @@ Damien Miller
 
 [1] http://violet.ibs.com.au/openssh/files/ChangeLog
 
```
-
$OpenBSD: releasenotes.html,v 1.69 2024/03/11 10:39:57 djm Exp $ +
$OpenBSD: releasenotes.html,v 1.70 2024/07/01 07:57:15 djm Exp $ blob - fa949997df8d28147ec3211243af2ba9bfc630e1 blob + 55b3edc27ffcd12bd498e672d50e49adc4ea5403 --- openssh/security.html +++ openssh/security.html @@ -31,6 +31,35 @@ For more information, see the OpenBSD security page.
- July 1, 2024
  + sshd(8) in Portable OpenSSH versions 8.5p1 to 9.7p1 (inclusive). +
  + Race condition resulting in potential remote code execution. +
  + A race condition in sshd(8) could allow remote code execution as + root on non-OpenBSD systems. This attack could be prevented by + disabling the login grace timeout (LoginGraceTime=0 in + sshd_config) though this makes denial-of service against + sshd(8) considerably easier. +
  + For more information, please refer to the + release notes. + +
- July 1, 2024
  + ssh(1) in OpenSSH versions 9.5p1 to 9.7p1 (inclusive). +
  + Logic error in ObscureKeystrokeTiming option. +
  + A logic error in the implementation of the ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming + option rendered the feature ineffective and additionally exposed limited + keystroke timing information when terminal echo was disabled, e.g. while + entering passwords to su(8) or sudo(8). This condition could be avoided + for affected versions by disabling the feature using + ObscureKeystrokeTiming=no. +
  + For more information, please refer to the + release notes. +
- December 18, 2023
  ssh(1), sshd(8) in OpenSSH prior to version 9.6.
  blob - /dev/null blob + 5a741f7bc6bed89d4a29721305929347e333afb9 (mode 644) --- /dev/null +++ openssh/txt/release-9.8 @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +OpenSSH 9.8 was released on 2024-07-01. It is available from the +mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. + +OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and +includes sftp client and server support. + +Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their +continued support of the project, especially those who contributed +code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the +project. More information on donations may be found at: +https://www.openssh.com/donations.html + +Security +======== + +This release contains fixes for two security problems, one critical +and one minor. + +1) Race condition in sshd(8) + +A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable OpenSSH +versions 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may allow arbitrary code +execution with root privileges. + +Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc +systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack requires on +average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to the maximum the +server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be +possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's likely that +these attacks will be improved upon. + +Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been +examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream Linux +distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection +ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't +understand why) may potentially have an easier path to exploitation. +OpenBSD is not vulnerable. + +We thank the Qualys Security Advisory Team for discovering, reporting +and demonstrating exploitability of this problem, and for providing +detailed feedback on additional mitigation measures. + +2) Logic error in ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming + +In OpenSSH version 9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive), when connected to an +OpenSSH server version 9.5 or later, a logic error in the ssh(1) +ObscureKeystrokeTiming feature (on by default) rendered this feature +ineffective - a passive observer could still detect which network +packets contained real keystrokes when the countermeasure was active +because both fake and real keystroke packets were being sent +unconditionally. + +This bug was found by Philippos Giavridis and also independently by +Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford of the +University of Cambridge Computer Lab. + +Worse, the unconditional sending of both fake and real keystroke +packets broke another long-standing timing attack mitigation. Since +OpenSSH 2.9.9 sshd(8) has sent fake keystoke echo packets for +traffic received on TTYs in echo-off mode, such as when entering a +password into su(8) or sudo(8). This bug rendered these fake +keystroke echoes ineffective and could allow a passive observer of +a SSH session to once again detect when echo was off and obtain +fairly limited timing information about keystrokes in this situation +(20ms granularity by default). + +This additional implication of the bug was identified by Jacky Wei +En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford and we thank them +for their detailed analysis. + +This bug does not affect connections when ObscureKeystrokeTiming +was disabled or sessions where no TTY was requested. + +Future deprecation notice +========================= + +OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in +early 2025. This release disables DSA by default at compile time. + +DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being +limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its +estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric equivalent. + +OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained +run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only mandatory-to- +implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly because alternative +algorithms were encumbered by patents when the SSHv2 protocol was +specified. + +This has not been the case for decades at this point and better +algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH +implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining DSA +in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from OpenSSH +can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography +libraries. + +This release, and its deactivation of DSA by default at compile-time, +marks the second step in our timeline to finally deprecate DSA. The +final step of removing DSA support entirely is planned for the first +OpenSSH release of 2025. + +DSA support may be re-enabled in OpenBSD by setting "DSAKEY=yes" +in Makefile.inc. To enable DSA support in portable OpenSSH, pass +the "--enable-dsa-keys" option to configure. + +Potentially-incompatible changes +-------------------------------- + + * all: as mentioned above, the DSA signature algorithm is now + disabled at compile time. + + * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that + repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever + completing authentication or that crash the server. See the + discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information. + Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or + servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or + proxies may need to consider these settings. + + * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8), + and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much + smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH + protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege + separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and + disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further + separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is + planned for the future. + + * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some + log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process + named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd". + + * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines + containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error. + This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new + "-q" flag to silence them altogether. + + * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0] + as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5) + directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This + defaults to "sshd". bz2101 + + * (portable OpenSSH only) Automatically-generated files, such as + configure, config.h.in, etc will now be checked in to the portable + OpenSSH git release branch (e.g. V_9_8). This should ensure that + the contents of the signed release branch exactly match the + contents of the signed release tarball. + +Changes since OpenSSH 9.7 +========================= + +This release contains mostly bugfixes. + +New features +------------ + + * sshd(8): as described above, sshd(8) will now penalise client + addresses that, for various reasons, do not successfully complete + authentication. This feature is controlled by a new sshd_config(5) + PerSourcePenalties option and is on by default. + + sshd(8) will now identify situations where the session did not + authenticate as expected. These conditions include when the client + repeatedly attempted authentication unsucessfully (possibly + indicating an attack against one or more accounts, e.g. password + guessing), or when client behaviour caused sshd to crash (possibly + indicating attempts to exploit bugs in sshd). + + When such a condition is observed, sshd will record a penalty of + some duration (e.g. 30 seconds) against the client's address. If + this time is above a minimum configurable threshold, then all + connections from the client address will be refused (along with any + others in the same PerSourceNetBlockSize CIDR range) until the + penalty expire. + + Repeated offenses by the same client address will accrue greater + penalties, up to a configurable maximum. Address ranges may be + fully exempted from penalties, e.g. to guarantee access from a set + of trusted management addresses, using the new sshd_config(5) + PerSourcePenaltyExemptList option. + + We hope these options will make it significantly more difficult for + attackers to find accounts with weak/guessable passwords or exploit + bugs in sshd(8) itself. This option is enabled by default. + + * ssh(8): allow the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the + implicit fallback from certificate host key to plain host keys. + +Bugfixes +-------- + + * misc: fix a number of inaccuracies in the PROTOCOL.* + documentation files. GHPR430 GHPR487 + + * all: switch to strtonum(3) for more robust integer parsing in most + places. + + * ssh(1), sshd(8): correctly restore sigprocmask around ppoll() + + * ssh-keysign(8): stricter validation of messaging socket fd GHPR492 + + * sftp(1): flush stdout after writing "sftp>" prompt when not using + editline. GHPR480 + + * sftp-server(8): fix home-directory extension implementation, it + previously always returned the current user's home directory + contrary to the spec. GHPR477 + + * ssh-keyscan(1): do not close stdin to prevent error messages when + stdin is read multiple times. E.g. + echo localhost | ssh-keyscan -f - -f - + + * regression tests: fix rekey test that was testing the same KEX + algorithm repeatedly instead of testing all of them. bz3692 + + * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): clarify the KEXAlgorithms directive + documentation, especially around what is supported vs available. + bz3701. + +Portability +----------- + + * sshd(8): expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 always to PAM auth modules + unconditionally. The previous behaviour was to expose it only when + particular authentication methods were in use. + + * build: fix OpenSSL ED25519 support detection. An incorrect function + signature in configure.ac previously prevented enabling the recently + added support for ED25519 private keys in PEM PKCS8 format. + + * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): allow the presence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY + environment variable to enable SSH_ASKPASS, similarly to the X11 + DISPLAY environment variable. GHPR479 + + * build: improve detection of the -fzero-call-used-regs compiler + flag. bz3673. + + * build: relax OpenSSL version check to accept all OpenSSL 3.x + versions. + + * sshd(8): add support for notifying systemd on server listen and + reload, using a standalone implementation that doesn't depend on + libsystemd. bz2641 + +Checksums: +========== + + - SHA1 (openssh-9.8.tar.gz) = bc45cedae7f70b41e9922ef4c9f56e74b9a659b7 + - SHA256 (openssh-9.8.tar.gz) = Dnc69VLWFBFdiaz8wySPlvHjb7wZfh/kblQ8ISuQr1Y= + + - SHA1 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz) = a0bb501b11349f5c5c33a269351be091dc2c2727 + - SHA256 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz) = 3YvQAqN5tdSZ37BQ3R+pr4Ap6ARh9LtsUjxJlz9aOfM= + +Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not +hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP +key used to sign the releases is available from the mirror sites: +https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc + +Reporting Bugs: +=============== + +- Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html + Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh@openssh.com + +

OpenSSH 9.8: July 1, 2024

OpenSSH 9.7: March 11, 2024

OpenSSH 9.8/9.8p1 (2024-07-01)

OpenSSH 9.7/9.7p1 (2024-03-11)